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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
LA MAR PEAY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PROVO
CITY SCHOOL DISTRIGr, a body corporate and politic, and MERRILL CHRI~
TOPHERSON, RAY MURDOCK, SHIRLEY PAXMAN, WILFORD/ E. SMITH,
and LA MAR EMPEY, Members of said
Board,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE
NO. 9722

Respondents' Petition for Rehearing
and Brief on Petition for Rehearing
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Defendants and respondents respectfully petition this

court for its order granting rehearing in the above entitled

case.
This petition is based upon the following points, whereby it asserts the court has erred, hereinafter argued in the
brief annexed hereto and made part of this petition:
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Point 1: In arriving at its .decision, this court appar.
ently gave no consideration to the rule of statutory constuction that contemporaneous and official executive interpretation is entitled to weight in judicial interpretation at
a statute.
Point ll: It would appear the construction placed upon section 11, Chapter 104, L. U. '61, limiting the vote to
those electo~s who have paid a property tax in the preceding year is a strained construction.
Point m: If persoos voting in the election called pursuant to sectiO!ll 11, Chapter 104, L. U. '61, should have
been restricted to qualified electocs who have paid a property tax, then the court should have required a shoiWing
tlbat sufficient invalid votes were cast to change the elec·
tion results.
Point IV: The proposition .voted upon was not alll·
bigUotts;. but was tied directly to the statutory authority,
incorporating the statute itself therein.
Point V: It would appear there is no basis for the
awarding ·of· oost:s against defendants and respondents.
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Attorney for Defendants and

Respondents
BRIEF ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Except to the eXtent attention is drawn thereto in the
~·~ent, we believe the · facts require no further restatement. We pr~, therefore, to the argument on the

pOintS asserted as error.
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POINT I
IN ARRIVING AT ITS DECISION, THIS COURT
APPARENTLY GAVE NO CONSIDERATION TO THE
RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THA'r CONTEMPORANEOUS AND OFFICIAL EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATION IS ENTITLED TO WEIGHT IN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE.
Section 53-7-12, U. C. A. '53, referred to by Section 11,
Chapter 104, L. U. '61, for the procedure in which the leeway election should be called, was enacted originally as part
of Section 2 (75-12-12), Chapter 80, L. U. 1947. It has
remained uncllanged since its initial enactment.

In his opinion No. 369, dated November 23, 1949, ad-"~
~ to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the
Attorney General construed this statute as permitting au·
qualified electors to vote at an election ·called thereunder,
Biennial Report, Attorney General of Utah, Biennium ended
June 30, 1950. That opinion states- in part:
"While -this section provides that in submitting
such a question to the electors 'the Board of Education
shall . . . follow the procedure in elections for the issuance of bonds so far as applimble,' I have not been
able to find any. provision setting forth any special
qualification for voters participating in
el~on
held pursuant to Section 75-12-12 [53-7-12, U CA. ;53].
I am of the opinion, therefore, that any qualified voter
in the school district where such an ~lection is Qe-ing
held is privileged to cast his or her vote regaXilless Qf
whether or not he or she may have paid a -property

an

tax."

'

The· Legislature has met in general session six times
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since this interpretation was given by the Attorney General. It has seen fit to make major changes in practically
each such session in sohool financing legislation, but it has
left the questioned statute unchanged. Presumably many
Boards Q!f Education have availed themselves <Xf this statute.~ gnq pre~umably they have relied upon the intepretation thus given in calling such elections.
We are nort unmindful that courts are not necessarily
bound by executive or administrative interpretation of statutes. HO!We·ver, ·this court has given weight to such inter·
pretation when sueh interpretation has been of long stand·
ing an.d rights and duties have accrued thereunder. State
v. Alta Club, 120 Utah 121, 232 P. 2d 759, State v. Hatch,
9 Utah 2.d 288, 342 p, 2d 1103, in re Cowan's Est.are, 98
Utah 393, 99 P. 2d. 605·, Southwestern Explo:ration Co. v.
County of Orange, 283 P. 2d 25·"ll 44 Oal. 2d 549, Mountain
View Union High School v. City Council, 335 P. 2d. 957, 168
C. A .. 2d 8R See also 2 Sutherland, S~tutory Construction,
(3d Ed), Sec.'s 5101 and following:
In its opinion this court states, in discussing the question of legislative intent:
"In this connection it is legitimate to take cognizance of legislative policy as demonstrated in the
clQsely analogous s.ituations involving the incurring of
indebtedness by school districts dealt with in Chapter
10 of Title 53.- . . .'' (Emphasis added).

We- respectfully assert that this statement does not accurately represent the facts. First, the respective sit~a
tiOils ··are not necessarily closely analogous. The mcurnng
of indebtedness fixes fiscal obligations :for future years with·
out regard to subsequent changes in administration or needs.
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The "leeway, proposition is merely permissive, allowing
Boards of Education greater resources, from year to year,
depending on Board policy, in operating revenue available.
More important, the property tax qualification for voting on
incurri:ng of indebtedness is NOT a ,matter of legislative
pollcy; it is a matter of constitutional mandate, set :f:brtlh
in Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitution. No such constitutional mandate exists as regards special taxes. Article
I, Section 4, and Article IV, Section 7, Utah Constitution.
See also Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of
the Convention to Adopt a Constitution for the State of
Utah, pages 231-233, 778-783, and 1142.

We respectfully state that no legislative policy is discernable in Utah on such questions. Section 26-14-10, U.
C. A. '53 provides that the board of trustees of a Mosquito
Abatement District may call an election to submit the question of additional tax levy, submitting the proposition "to
the electors of the district," without regard to property
qualifications. Petitions to annex additional area must be
signed by owners of more than half the assessed valuation
of the proposed annexation, but upon such petition, the
proposition is submitted "to the electors of the district''
without regard to p~perty qualification. 26-14-12, U. C. A..
'53.
Only electors who shall have paid a property tax are
qualified to vote on propositions involved in a Cemetery
Maintenance District, 8-1-5 U. C. A. '53. No vote at all is
provided as a condition of creating a Water Conservancy
District. Chapter 9, Title 73, U. C. A. '53. Borth may fix
tax levies.

The creation of a Metropolitan Water Di.stli-ct is by
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vote of all electors residing within the proposed district
wifuout regard to property qualif1cations. 73-8-8 u. c.~
'53. Yet Metropolitan Water Districts have the levy fixing power.
The statute authorizing Fire Protection Districts, which
may fix tax levies, states ". . . Qualified electors, under
the general laws of the state, living within such district
shall be entitled to vote on the question of whether the
distict shall or shall .not be created." 17-9-5 U. C. A. '53.
Our search has not been exhaustive. The foregoing is
submitted merely to illustrate the absence of any fixed legislative policy which may be used as a basis for interpreting
section 53-7-12, U. C. A. '53.

POINT II
IT W 0 U L D APPEAR THE CONSTRUCTION
PLACED UPON SECTION 11, CHAPrER 104, L. U. '61,
LIMITING THE VOTE TO THOSE ELECTORS WHO
HAVE PAID A PROPERTY TAX IN THE PRECEDING
YEAR IS A STRAINED CONISTRUCTION.
That section is permissive, allowing a board of education to raise additional operating revenue fort the school
system, should it choose, "with the consent of a majority
of the electors of the distr1ct," NOT "with the consent of
a majority of the electors of the district who shall have
paid property tax in such district in the year next preced·
ing such election."
The remainder of that section dealing with the obtaining -of such consent is concerned with procedure, not
with the substantive qualification of electors. The statute
merely says such election shall be "held . . . in the man-
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ner set forth in Section 53-2(7)-12, Utah Code Annotated
1953." That is, the mechanics of the call, setting up, and
conducting the election is as therein provided.
That section, in twn, states that "the board of education shall give such reasonable n()tice of such submission as

it may deem proper, and shall follow the procedUre in elections for the issuance ·of bonds so far as applicable." (Emphasis added). -~Here again, the legislature is talking of the
mechanics of the election, not substantive qualification of
electors.
...·· ...

The opinion of the Court, relying upon section 53:1011, U. C. A. '53, dealing with qualifications of voters on an
election to create indebtedness, states that rthe interpretation
urged would render part of that_ section moperative. . We ,
submit that such is precisely the function of the phrase · ·
..so far as applicable" in section 53-7-12 U. C. A. '53. "• The ...
construction placed by the court rend~rs the pliTase ·'so
as applicable' entirely meaningless. We respectfully urge
that the court has, in con~truing the several )statutes,
fused first, the question of qualification of electors and ,the ·
mechanics af cOnducting the election, and second, the. matter of an election for a special tax~ wherein the legisla~ -.
may or may not require a. property qualification O!f th~
elector, and the matter of an election. for .the purpose of·
inrurring indebtedness; wherein the legislature has no pr~·:

far .

con-

rogative.

. ..

In an inStances we have ·found where we believe the.''
legislature intended to inipose the 'property qualification on ·
electors, it has expressly so -stated. Here the _court has
read the limitation into- the act by implication. We believ~,:
the law should.. be that no construction. of an election_la~,:
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should be indulged in which would disfranchise any voter
if the law is reasonably susceptible to any other meaning:
Patterson v. Justus, 173 Kan. 207, 245 P. 2d 968. Indeed
this court went far along the trail of this rule in Rothf~
v. Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P. 2d 612, when it permitted those whom many might consider transients to help
choose state and local officers who in turn exercise pow.
ers of the, sovereign fax greater than that of fixing a limited mill levy. We respectfully but firmly assert that the
decision of this case reverses that direction with a vengeance.
1

POINT

m

IF PERSONS VOTING IN THE ELECTION CALLED

PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, CHAPI'ER 104, L. U. '61,
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO QUALIFIED
ELECTORS WHO HAD PAID PROPERTY TAX, THEN
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED A SHOWING
THAT SUFFICIENT INVALID VOTES WERE CAST TO
CHANGE THE ELECTION RESULT.
The pleadings show that this is an election contest.
The complaint expressly so states. The answer denied specifically that unqualified voters cast ballots or, in the alternative, that if any did, they .were not sufficient in num·
ber to alter the results. As far as we know, or as far as
the record shows, no elector who had not paid a property
tax in the district in the year preceding the election cast
a ballot in the election here contested.
The decision of this court merely states that the act
"requires property taxpayer qualification ,for voting at the
election provided therein." Perhaps this requirement was
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met Certainly the burden of showing otherwise rests upon
plaintiff.
Section 20.15-1 U.C.A. '53, as far as appliCaJble, states:
uThe election . . . to deteJ.mine any proposition
submitted to a vote of the people, may be contested:

(4) When illegal votes have been received, or legal
votes have been rejected, at the polls sufficient to
change the result.
. . . ." (Emphasis added)
This point was argued before the trial judge, but, in
view of his construction of the ·statute, this was considered
immaterial. We urged this position on argument before
this court. We do not believe the dedsion answers this
question, or, if it does, tt reverses a position previously taken.
Whitmore v. Carbon County, 36 Utah 394, 104 Pac.
222, concerned a writ of prohibition to restrain the issuance
of bonds pursuant to an election. The resolution stating
'1hat the question of the issuance of such bonds be submitted to the qualified electors of said Carbon County at
a special election which is hereby called for that purpose."
The notice of election did not specify limitation on electors
voting, though it stated that the election was called and
would be held "as provided by law."
This court, in denying the writ, stated:

"It is alleged in the answer to the petition for the
writ, and it is admitted by the petitioner, that only
such qualified voters as had paid a property tax in the
<nmty in the year 1908 were permitted to vote, and
only such voted at the election.
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. . . It is now contended .by the petitioner that the
election is void because the notices did not specify the
particular qualifications whkh entitled the electors to
vote. And it is especially contended thaf the· notices
were insuffi~i~n~. be!Cause tpey did.nOit contain the state.
men~ oc specificatiqn,. _in sub~tanpe_ or effect, that none
but qualified voters who had paid a property 1;<qc in
the cormty in the year .1908, or in tlle. year. next preceding the.· el~tion, were entitled to vOte. ·The statute
· · - itself prescribes the qualificatiOIIlS of such el~tocs. It
was not essential to set them forth in the nortice. (Cases
cited) The function and purpose of the notice is not
.to noti.ty ,the public and taxpayers what the law is1 but
·to nqtify~ ther.n. 9f. the ~proposed action to be taken, and
of the time and place when and whe~ tbe consent of
.thos.~ entitled by 1~'":', to giye hoJditmay be''obtruned.
·we d~ not see any 'meTit to the contention." .

or.

The same position was again taken by this court in
Van Orden y. Boar~ of Education, 56 Utah 4~0, 191 Pac.
230.
We again draw the COUI"t's attentio~ that ~ndents
have never admitted in the case at bar that non-taxpayirtg .
electors voted in the. contested election.. we have, in the
aiternati~e, pleaded that .if such be the ,Ca.se, i~liffictent
such votes were cast to alter th~ results. We assert that
on the authority orf this court, and should it adhe~e· to its '
position that the statutes h~re. involyed restrict voters at
"leeway" elections to those who. have paid a property tax,
the appellant still must show that sufficient vOtes were cast
by unqualified electors; to change· the results.
·. Not only is this poirit naturally of concern to defend·
ants and res:~IJ.d.~~'· but it s~ouid. be imperative that other
boards of education have a clear answer.·
·
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U the absence from the notice calling such election
of the statement that only electors who have paid a property tax in the district in the preceding year may vote voids
the election, and if that alone voids it, then boards of education thl'oughout the state should be made aware thereof,
as should boards of county commissioners, who actually fix
the levy annually. The authority granted by "leeway" elections is a continuing one, several boards of education have
called such elections in years passed, and assert authority
under the results thereof which they may well not have under such an interpretation.
If the interpretation is in fact otherwise, then we are
at a loss to understand how the election in question is voided
on this point. Olson v. Fleming, 254 P. 2d 335, 174 Kan.
177. See also Sacramento County v. Stephens, 53 P2d 197,
11 Cal. App 2d 110.

POINT IV
THE PROPOSITION VOTED UPON WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS, BUT WAS TIED DIRECTLY TO THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY, INCORPORATING THE STATUTE ITSELF THEREIN.

In holding our position on the qualification of electors
tmtenable, the decision of this court states that we would
thereby give effect to a part of the statute and ignore others. We respectfully but strenuously urge that in holding
the proposition placed upon the ballot void for ambiguity,
this court does exactly the same thing. It would appear
to completely ignore the phrase "as provided in Section 11,
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961," and the further phrase
"as provided by law."
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The only legislative authority by way of leeway elections is that contained in the last sentence of the first paragraph of section 11:
"Said voted leeway program shall· not exceed an
amonnt equal to 20% of the basic program of the district." (Emphasis addd)
The "State-supported minimum program' or "minimum
school program" as defined in sub-section (a) of Section 3,
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, is defined as including
many matters not the conce,rn of the local districts. The
proposition upon whieh the electors voted does NOT use the
phrases ''state" supported minimum program'' 0[' ''minimum
school program." It poses the question whetheT the board
may ''maintain a 'voted leeway' program as provided in Section 11, Laws of Utah 1961, nOit to ~ceed ten per cent
(10%) of the minimum basic program prorvided by law."
(Emphasis added).
Admittedly, the use of the word 'minimum' was unfortunate, but we fail to see wherein that word would mislead a vote. It should be understood that we deem the entire legislative arrangement for school financing unduly
intricate, complex and far from a model of legal draftsmanship. We challenge anyone to draft a proposition for a 'leeway' election that is simple and lucid. We submit that the
simplest form to submit the proposition is by express reference to the statute itself, and this is what was done.
An analogous problem was presented to the supreme
court of Kansas in the case of Gray v. Joint Rural High
School District, 286 P. 2d 147, 178 Kan. 387. Thls was a
consolidated action to enjoin two boards~ education from
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t.ssuing bonds to construct a joint high school, pursuant to
an election held in the two districts. Most issues therein
discussed are not material here. The court refused the
injunction.
One of the grounds urged for the injunction was that

the proposition placed on the ballot was ambiguous and un-

certain. The proposition thus stated on the ballot was
whether the district could issue its bonds "not to exceed" a
given figure. In each instance the figure stated in the
proposition, if bonds were issued therefore, would cause that
disbict to exceed its statutory debt limitation.

The court stated:
"It is to be noted further that the proposals were
to vote bonds in an amount no.t to exceed (sic) a stated
amount. Any contention that the exact amount of
txmds to be issued was not stated and therefore the
elections were illegal cannot be sustained. At the time
of the elections there was nothing to indicate the full
amount would not be issued and sold. In Pittsburg
Board of Education vs. Davis 120 Kan. 768, 245 P.
112, it was held that the fact that the statutes prohibited the issuance of bonds in e~cess of the amount
named does not prohibit voting for more than that
amotmt In that opinion cases in support are· reviewed.
In an analogous case this court, considering a proposition submitted wherein bonds 'not exceeding' a stated
sum were voted upon,. held that 'this slight departure
from the precision of statement required by the statute,'
did not render the proposed issue illegal." (Cases cited)

The court further states:

"There was nothing miSleading fore the reasons ~e

electors knew at all times they could not exceed

the

·

statutory seven per cent limitation, and they were ad-
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viSed· by. the question submitted that the total cost
stated _was not a finality, but only an estimated cost."

The coUrt of course pointed out that the districts could
not issue bonds exceeding the seven per cent debt limitation, _but'. that question_ was not befure the coUrt.

To. th~ ·~on ~t the proposition on the ballot was
vodd and._anrbi~ous beca~ of the 1-ge used, the court

states:
· "We- have not overlooked the- criticism of appel·

!ants that the statute, 72-507, states that tJhe

·COQPel'·,.

ating school boards shall detennine and agree upon the
total estimated cost of the joint building .,and· the
:•,: amotintt<rbe-b:n:n by'each Of the uniting districts,' while
· the- concluding part- of -the question submitted states
the bOnds: -of ·District 9 shall not be issued unless Dis·
tricrt 30 shall- authorize- $122,000 of bonds to pay its
share- of the -cost (sic). Appellants seem to ·conterui

the voters were misled ·because of the use of the word
'share"- -instead of the word 'amount'. Assuming the
word 'share' should not have been su!bstituted, we do
'think anyone was confused in the slightest because
it ·was."

noit

Els~here; ···in dis~ussing the fact that the amount of
the bonds authorized exceeded the debt liprlt, and the ef·
feet thereof on ·the fact that each district's election was
tied tQ the other, the court states:.

we

"Nor do·
think the voters had any cause to
believe that regardless of -~he amount 9f bonds ~trict
9 might issue, District 30 had no choice hut to issue
- bonds in the amount o!f $122,000. They must be pre. sumed·-to knoi\v that .the electors of that distriq were
under -the same statutory authorio/ and: restri~?ES as
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they were, and this appears in the question submitted
where those statutes are specifically mentioned. In our
opinion, the proposition and question submitted were
substantially in accord with the statute and the voters
were not misled.''

In the case at bar, the respondents sought authority
from the electors, not to incur a specific debt for a specific
capital improvement, but to maintain operations at a continuing higher level than they could otherwise. What better way is there to define the authority sought than to refer specifically to the statute under whilch the authority is
sought? The Kansas court sees this as sufficient. Nor
did it find that the voters were misled because the proposition submitted used the word 'share' instead of 'amount'.
Nor do we believe it can be asserted or inferred that
the electors in the election here contested were misled. What

was sought was one half the maximum authority obtainable

under the provisions of Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws orf
Utah 1961. The proposition states exactly that, with the
further proviso, "as provided by law". Certainly no one
asserts that the Board would or possibly could acquire more
authority than that through a leeway election.
The cases of Whitmore v. Carbon County, 36 Utah 394,
104 Pac. 222, and Van Orden v. Board of Education, 56 Utah
430, 191 Pac. 230, cited elsewhere herein on the question
of qualifications of electors, present an analogy we believe
valid. We paraphrase by stating that the function and purpose of the proposition is not to notify the public and>the
taxpayers what the law is, but to notify them of·-th~ ·proposed action to be taken.
.. .
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POINT V
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE IS NO BASIS
FOR THE AWARDING OF COSTS AG!AINST DEFEND.
ANTS AND RESP01NDENTS.
This action was brought against the Board ~ Education of Provo City School District and the members of the
board, as such members. We take respondents to be an
agency of the State of Utah.
Rule 54 (d) (1) U. R. C. P. provides:

". . . . Costs against the State o!f Utah, its Olffi.
cers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law."
We bclieve this to have always been the law. We find
no statute upon which the award herein made is based.

Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 P. 2d 393.
The only statute we find which by the greatest stretch
of imagination could be held to authorize award of costs

is Chapter 15 of Title 20, U. C. A. '53. We state that this

does nort apply, as provisions theTein go only to the question of election contests as between candidates. Moreover,
though the pleadings are framed as an election contest, this
court apparently does not so consider the case.
If we are in error in this conclusion, then section 20·

15-1, U. C. A. 53, quoted under Point ill herein, would liP'
ply, and this court should have remanded the case for a
determination whether illegal votes cast would change the
result.
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CONCLUSION
Wl' are informed that some nine Boards of Education,
administering school districts with a total school population representing a substantial majority of that in the State,,
are operating under authority granted by "leeway" elections. We are further informed that in none of the elections we1·e property qualifications required, at least in tlhe
notices calling such elections. Apparently their counsel
1·ead the statutes as we do. The Attorney Gene~al so read
the statutes, as did the trial court. 'rhis court is the first
official body to give the construction in the decision.
The proposition voted upon in Provo City School District was debated long and loud in the community, ·in publlc meetings and in the press. Counsel for appellant participated therein. No question as to the interpretation of
the statute or meaning of the proposition as phrased in the
notice calling the election was raised by anyone. Debate
was on the merits of the proposed authority sought by the
board. No one claimed to be misled. A substantial majority of voters indicated a desire for an enlarged school
program. There is no showing that unqualified electors
voted, regardless of the qualification imposed. It does not
lie now y,ith appellant to question action of the electorate.
We believe the court should reverse the electorate only on
most compelling grounds. The grounds stated in the opinion are, we submit, not compelling.
Another matter of grave concern arises, in view of the
provisions of sections 59-11-11 U. C. A. '53, and 59-10-14,
U. C. A. '53, and the cases decided by this court thereunder..
Although the applicability of these sections to the problem
at hand cannot be determined in this case, the possibilities
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in a later case on facts of which we may not now be aware,
could be catastrophic to school districts not presently ,00.
fore the eourt. The decision herein, we suggest, might open
a plethora of litigation.
We re!Spectfully request that the petition for rehearing
be granted, and that upon hearing thereon, this court af.
firm the trial court.
Respectfully sUJbmitted,

ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Attorney for Respondents
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